‘Soldier F’ case must be viewed in context

As mentioned 1,441 members of the British armed forces lost their lives during Operation Banner. However, in the context of Lt Col Vaudin’s article I believe it is worth noting that only approximately half of these deaths were attributed to terrorist action by the Ministry of Defence. I also believe it is worth noting that of the 363 deaths caused by security forces, over half were civilian casualties.

The article continues to describe the early release of prisoners in the wake of the Belfast Agreement. The Sentence Review Commission which oversaw release of prisoners had specific eligibility criteria before early release was granted. One such condition was that the prisoner must be affiliated to a paramilitary organisation which maintained an unequivocal ceasefire. I also note that as enshrined in the Belfast Agreement itself, while many will have found early release of prisoners to be abhorrent, it was arguably a necessary concession by the British government in order to achieve a lasting peace. In reference to On The Run letters, these were initially intended to be a temporary measure to extend the spirit of the Sentence Review Commission activity to those who were not in jail so could not apply (i.e. had escaped or had fled the country before conviction). In the specific case of John Downey, his letter had been issued in error as he was still wanted over the Hyde Park Bombing.

The next key point in the article is that the ‘vast majority [of UK security forces] served with courage, professionalism and a restraint that was often super human.’ Whilst I have confidence that this may be the case, it merely highlights that the few who did not serve to the same high standard should be held to account if their actions caused unjustified deaths, injuries or damage. The point that restraint was not shown by the IRA demonstrates whataboutery and I’m confident that many would expect the British Army to be held to a higher standard than an irregular, paramilitary force.

Lt Col Vaudin himself writes that those sent into combat must be held to the highest of standards and that if these aren’t met the individuals should be prosecuted. In regards to the inconsistency of treatment between security forces and paramilitary forces, I would refer back to the earlier point that though early releases and On The Run letters may leave a bitter taste to many, they were an integral part of the peace process. I would also like to note that even those who benefited from an early release did serve at least part of their sentence, but members of the security forces who have not been prosecuted until this time have not had to face this.

It seemed odd that the event which assumingly precipitated the article, the decision to prosecute Soldier F, is hardly discussed. The Saville Report, which was published in 2010, clearly presents what the evidence suggests were the actions of Soldier F, and the wider British forces, on that day. It is unambiguous in its conclusions that the British forces were unjustified in their actions which resulted in the deaths of 13 civilians, and that none of those killed posed a threat to security forces. The report is also clear that it is highly likely that Soldier F was aware as he fired that his targets did not pose a threat to him or his colleagues. If this was the case, as evidence gathered by the PSNI presumably corroborates, it is just that he faces trial for his actions on Bloody Sunday. I would urge anyone to read the Saville Report before passing judgement.

It was regrettable that the original article did not reference the wider events of Bloody Sunday or the Saville Report findings which would have obviously allowed the reader to make a more balanced judgement concerning the case of Soldier F. I have no doubt that we have much to be thankful for when discussing the service of British military personnel, however this gratitude should not cloud our judgement when an abominable event such as Bloody Sunday occurs.

ETI ALBIN

Address withheld.