Guernsey Press

Consensus government is not fit for purpose

IF ANYONE ever doubted my proposition that consensus government just does not, and cannot, work with 38 deputies plus two (see my letter of 10 October) then, surely, the four miserable days of extended, fractious and effectively inconclusive debate about tax, is incontrovertible evidence.

Published

In response to their defeat, P&R made the unprecedented suggestion of calling an early general election. That, however, will not solve the underlying problem, and it would be just another diversionary waste of resource and effort, since it could apparently only bring forward the end of this States’ term by a few months maximum, in any event. Rather than pursue that course, I would suggest that now is the very moment when such resource and effort should instead go into devising a more efficient mechanism for government, and this must mean some degree of executive government. I would put forward something along the following lines.

After their election to the States, the 38 (plus two) deputies elect from among their number the chief minister by a series of elections in which the candidate securing the lowest vote is eliminated before the following round. This method would secure the candidate with the greatest overall degree of general approval from States members. Importantly, the chief minister can always, subsequently, be removed from this position by a simple majority vote of no confidence by States members.

The functions of P&R are divided between a Policy Committee, and a Finance Committee. The chief minister is ex officio president of the Policy Committee. The chief minister himself appoints, (taking into account his knowledge of his colleagues and their skills) the presidents of the major committees of the States, including the Finance Committee, and these presidents are, ex officio, the members of the Policy Committee, which thus becomes the senior committee of the States, effectively a cabinet. Included in the chief minister’s appointments is a cabinet secretary whose personal function is that of monitoring, and co-ordinating the business of committees and matters which any committee proposes, or thinks necessary, to bring to the States.

This is to ensure that the business of government as a whole is cohesive, rather than being ‘siloed’. By this function, also, any problems or disadvantages, (such as the recent clash between planning decisions and the provision of much-needed housing at the disused Castel Hospital site) are spotted, and can be resolved in an orderly way outside the actual business of the States. The cabinet secretary would also, conveniently, be president of the Oversight and Scrutiny Committee. The chief minister has the power to remove and replace any committee president.

As to the membership of committees, deputies submit to the cabinet secretary their preferences as to which committees they would wish, or feel suited, to serve upon. Committee memberships are then allocated by the cabinet secretary in consultation with the chief minister and the relevant committee president. Proposals as to matters within the committee’s area of operation are formulated by the relevant committee and brought to the Policy Committee before submission to the States as a whole. If a committee member disagrees with the proposal which his committee, by majority, wishes to submit and pursue, then that member may not speak against or vote against such proposal and remain on the committee; his choice is either to remain silent and abstain from any vote, or to resign from the committee and be free to speak and vote as he chooses.

Such a structure for the conduct of States’ business would inject a degree of coherence and efficiency into it, by ensuring that proposals coming to the States had already been debated and examined, for their advantage or disadvantage, by the most appropriate and knowledgeable persons, and would avoid the chaotic consequences of the current free-for-all system. It contains checks and balances between according power to individuals in the interests of efficiency, and recognising the individuality of States members and their views, and their ultimate power to elect or remove the chief minister. Other matters, such as, for example, remitting certain powers on local issues to the douzaines, and effecting an amendment to the standing orders of States meetings to control and curtail the absurd amount of speech-making which is currently permitted to go on (and on and on) in States meetings, are also needed, but they are matters of detail.

Perhaps most importantly, since one knows that turkeys do not vote for Christmas, the introduction of such a system would not require any current deputy to vote for something which might impair his or her own prospects of re-election.

I am aware that in about 2002 the much respected former chief minister, Peter Harwood, presented a report which recommended the introduction of executive government, but that was rejected. Let us reflect where this has now got us, 20 years later. Even deputies as disparate as Deputy Ferbrache and Deputy Roffey have said that the current system just does not work. For the States to take time, now, to look to devising an effective and efficient system would at least demonstrate to the public that this States is intelligent and responsible enough to try to introduce a system of government in Guernsey which is actually fit for purpose. The present system, quite obviously, is not.

HARVEY MARSHALL

St Saviour’s