There is a fundamental flaw of governmental organisation that needs seismic change

As seen in countries all around the world, the people of Guernsey hold much contempt against their government, and they have the chance of being able to publicly voice criticism towards it, which they amply do. Indeed, scathing reviews of its politicians are commonplace, with criticism of individuals and political projects often the standard. However the fundamental issue is a structural one, but the constant changes and amendments to the uncodified constitution do not necessarily lend themselves to its understanding. Let us therefore delve into a superficial view of the state organisation, and the core inconsistencies that fail to make it up to par with international constitutions.

It can be asserted that the current structure of the States of Guernsey is indeed deeply flawed, by the general sentiments of dissatisfaction and confusion felt towards it. The numerous changes and attempts at amendments over only the last 20 years is unprecedented in the western world, and demonstrate a lack of conviction and confidence in the foundation of the current system. And that is perhaps the issue at hand, a democratic misuse of voter confidence by a fundamentally flawed and inefficient authority. I accuse the States of Deliberation of not giving state organisation the necessary attention, and of lacking the will to make important and necessary change on a studied and researched basis, for a long-term solution. The deputies’ regular constitutional amendments are proof of a lack of boldness and reflection, leading to general confusion about the government, highlighted by the people’s lack of political engagement. However, the foundation of democracy is popular engagement, and by alienating it, the States are failing one of their primary purposes.

Of the first of government powers, and perhaps the more important of the three described by Montesquieu in the spirit of law, we examine the judiciary. In a state with the rule of law, the judiciary becomes the most sacred of the powers, in France it is called an authority to highlight its seniority over the other two powers. The judiciary is the primary tool of defence for the citizen, against other citizens and against the state. In the form it is in currently, structural flaws are difficult to find, indeed, whilst it holds several particularities that make it relatively unique, it accomplishes its core duties all whilst maintaining its distance from the legislative and executive bodies of the state. Of its ‘irregularities’, the practice of the Jurats can be stated. Indeed, they act as jury in court, and are elected by the states of election. Whilst this practice could be subject to scrutiny in the future to decide on its regularity, no particular flaw springs to mind either. In this sense we can affirm that the judiciary seems to conform relatively well to international standards, and its separation from the politics of government is net and respected. Surely then, the judiciary is not at fault for the state’s failings.

Let us engage then in the examination of the States of Deliberation, firstly in its legislative form. Structurally, not much can be said about it, it is a chamber that discusses and votes on projects and propositions of law, such as any other legislative chamber. Perhaps one could criticise its unicameral aspect, noted by the lack of a senator’s chamber, and the outright abandonment of senators over the last 20 years. Indeed, some believe a higher chamber is necessary to provide contrast and steadfast vision against potentially populist, popular and inexperienced deputies. They provide in these cases consultative purposes, verifying and tempering the dispositions adopted by the lower chamber. However, I would argue that the States of Guernsey manage to work around this disposition by the inclusion of law officers of the crown in assembly meetings, providing a legal background to aid legislative officials. In this sense then I believe the faults around legislative duties is due to its internal regulation and the individuals inside of it, who’s position and lack of qualification could be blamed on numerous things including a questionable electoral process. However, this does not come under the organisation of the Assembly, but of Guernsey’s electoral process, an article for another time.

As we look into the States of Deliberation in its executive form, we notice what a cautious person might call a Guernsey quirk. Indeed, the third branch of the state, the executive, is organised by means of committees. Whilst this is not necessarily unobservable, we could question however the choice to organise these committees out of the legislative chamber. In fact, the legislative and the executive powers are entirely concentrated around the same chamber, the States of Deliberation. The executive power is separated between 14 (soon to be 15) committees, whose members are deputies from the State of Deliberation. In fact, some deputies are members in two or even three committees. The problems we can notice in the organisation of the executive power are numerous. Firstly, each position is voted independently by the deputies, meaning deputies with entirely different political objectives could work against each other within the same committee, leading to unproductive management and policy development. Secondly, whilst there is one senior committee, the P&R committee, whose president is often seen as de facto heir to the role of first minister, again, the non-coordination between committee presidents, and within the committees, means the president of P&R can hardly organise a national policy directive in an efficient manner. The executive power is therefore fraught with issues of organisation and coordination, making the progress towards change remarkably difficult, ultimately pleasing no one, and stagnating the island.

I’d like to touch finally on a major last point of state organisation, the relations between different powers, between the judiciary, the legislative and the executive. As we observed earlier, the States do an adequate job of isolating enough the judiciary from the other two powers, as is customary. Whilst I concede isolating the executive and the legislative is harder, levers and means of pressure, along with constitutional protection should create a healthy relation between separate legislative and executive bodies. However, as we observed, there is not an ounce of pretence that a separation between these powers exists in Guernsey. Indeed, the legislative and the executive are the same. As a result, there is no accountability between the two powers, no responsibility of one in front of the other, and no enforceability of project of one against the other. A lack of levers and means of pressure reinforce the stagnating nature of the executive organisation, which simply bleeds over into the legislative chamber, as they are the same body.

The government has led itself into an impasse, a cul-de-sac. The distinction between the executive and the legislative does not exist. The organisation of the executive hinders coordination of sectors, and decision making, creating a lack of political direction. The relations between the executive and the legislative lack levers of pressure on bodies or laws. There is an impossibility of responsibility from the executive in front of the legislative, of lack thereof from the legislative in front of the people.

With an election year, much focus is driven towards policy and change of direction. But the government is unable of going anywhere in the first place. There is a fundamental flaw of governmental organisation that needs seismic change. Be assured that some deputies are aware of this, and want development. Only, the support of the people is necessary for constitutional change, and patience.

Progress can only be made with the implementation of major change in government organisation.

PAUL MARTIN

Vale