This is about something much more serious than the latest disagreement over finding 1% savings in States expenditure. It is about what has happened to our system of government and how, over successive political terms, we have allowed Policy & Resources to become something approaching a government within a government.
We have created a monster.
Not deliberately, perhaps, and certainly not overnight. Successive Assemblies have allowed more and more financial and administrative influence to become concentrated in P&R. What was intended to be a senior committee providing leadership and coordination has acquired many of the practical powers of an executive, while remaining, constitutionally, just one committee of the States.
Consider the extent of that influence. The 2027 Budget allocates approximately £15.8m. directly to P&R, but once corporate services and associated expenditure are included, the figure rises to around £116m., considerably more than the £97.6m. allocated to Education, Sport & Culture.
Admittedly much of that expenditure provides services across government, but that is precisely the point. Property, IT, human resources and central financial services give P&R considerable influence over the operations of other committees.
And even that understates its reach. P&R oversees public sector pay negotiations, which influence one of the largest elements of expenditure in Education, Health and other committees. Those committees remain responsible for delivering services within their budgets, yet significant elements of their costs are determined centrally.
We have therefore created a system in which financial influence and political accountability are increasingly separated.
Some centralisation is necessary and sensible. Nobody seriously suggests that every committee should negotiate its own pay agreements or operate an entirely separate IT department. But there is an important difference between providing common services efficiently and accumulating so much influence that the committee responsible for coordination begins to regard itself as the government.
And that brings us back to Orwell’s
commandments.
During the GST debate, Deputy Andy Sloan proposed a cap on the growth of States expenditure. Much of the opposition centred on the precise wording of the proposition, particularly whether contributory pensions and other social insurance benefits would fall within its scope. We were treated to painstaking examinations of individual words and warnings that, whatever the proposer’s intentions, P&R would be obliged to implement the resolution exactly as written.
The wording was subsequently amended to exclude the relevant benefits, but the principle had been firmly established. The words of a States resolution mattered. Once the Assembly had given an instruction, P&R could not simply decide that it meant something else.
I agree entirely.
Yet consider what happens when the instruction is one P&R does not particularly like.
In January the States directed P&R to establish a programme of zero-based budgeting, examining material expenditure from first principles rather than simply assuming that existing spending was justified. By April, P&R was explaining that it was implementing priority-based budgeting instead.
There may be perfectly good arguments for priority-based budgeting. Indeed, it might ultimately prove more effective. But the States had made a specific decision. If P&R believed another approach was preferable, surely the proper course was to return to the Assembly and seek its agreement, rather than substitute its own preferred methodology.
And now, almost as if to provide another illustration of Orwell’s commandments, comes the extraordinary revelation about Agilisys. We were told last year that a full financial audit was being undertaken into the costs of terminating the £200m. IT contract. We now discover that no such audit ever took place. Instead, there was an internal financial review, without formal terms of reference, recorded dates, independent involvement or formal sign-off. P&R explains that the word audit was used in error.
How convenient that words which must be interpreted with such extraordinary precision when the States is considering an expenditure cap can acquire an entirely different meaning when P&R is explaining its own activities.
And this is not some trivial administrative misunderstanding. We are talking about the termination of one of the largest contracts entered into by the States, substantial transition costs and a replacement arrangement whose financial advantages have yet to be demonstrated publicly through independently verified figures. Yet the promised audit has apparently vanished.
One can almost imagine the animals returning to the barn wall and discovering that the commandment had always referred to a financial review, and that anyone who remembered the word audit must simply have been mistaken.
Then we have the extraordinary spectacle of Deputy Charles Parkinson describing the States’ instruction to pursue 1% annual savings as silly, suggesting that the Assembly should have learned its lesson about imposing such requirements.
This was an instruction from the elected Assembly to one of its committees. Deputy Parkinson was entitled to disagree with it, as indeed he had done. But disagreement does not confer authority to disregard a decision.
What makes the episode particularly remarkable is that P&R subsequently incorporated the projected savings into its tax reform proposals. Some £20m. of expenditure reductions were included in the financial case for increasing taxation. We are now entitled to ask whether those savings represented a credible commitment or simply helped make the proposed tax increases more acceptable.
The inconsistency is striking. When P&R or its supporters dislike a proposition, the precise wording becomes all-important. When P&R dislikes an instruction it has received, the emphasis shifts to what the committee considers practical or sensible. Sometimes the instruction is reinterpreted to mean something quite different from what the Assembly intended, and sometimes it appears to be disregarded altogether. And now it seems that even the words used to describe its own accountability can be retrospectively redefined.
The commandments on the barn wall have not quite been repainted, but their meaning appears remarkably adaptable. And when changing their meaning becomes too difficult, it seems the simplest solution is to pretend they were never written.
This is not an argument against leadership or against central coordination. It is an argument about the location of authority in our system of government.
Guernsey does not have a cabinet government. We have a committee system in which the States of Deliberation is the ultimate political authority. P&R is the senior committee, but its members possess no greater democratic mandate than their colleagues. Its responsibilities are extensive, but they do not place it above the Assembly.
If we want cabinet government, let us debate it openly and establish the necessary constitutional arrangements and accountability. There are respectable arguments in favour of such a change.
What we should not do is allow cabinet government to emerge by stealth, through the gradual concentration of financial power and the assumption that P&R may decide for itself how faithfully to implement the instructions it receives.
Nor should all the blame be placed upon the present committee. This has developed over successive administrations, with each Assembly allowing the centre to acquire greater influence. The present P&R has inherited a structure which encourages precisely the behaviour we are now witnessing.
But inheriting a monster does not excuse feeding it.
The fundamental principle of committee government is straightforward. Committees propose, the States decides and committees implement. Where circumstances change or an instruction proves impractical, the committee should explain the difficulty and seek a further decision from the Assembly.
That is accountability. It is not an optional courtesy extended by P&R when convenient.
The danger is that we gradually become accustomed to a different arrangement, one in which the States debates and passes resolutions while its senior committee decides which instructions deserve literal obedience, which can be adapted to suit its own preferences and which can simply be ignored.
Orwell’s animals eventually discovered that the rules under which they thought they were governed bore little resemblance to those being applied by their leaders.
We should be rather more vigilant about our own.