Improving Guernsey’s government

WHY does the structure of Guernsey’s government need to change?

By a gradual process, spread over many decades, the Guernsey civil service has gained total control over all policy and has used that control to further entrench the power of the unelected officials over the elected politicians.

A classic example of this process was the referendum on island-wide voting. Prior to the referendum only one proposal had been published detailing the way in which island-wide elections should be conducted. I was the author.

Even though it was the only choice available, my proposal was not considered for inclusion in the options put before voters. If it had been on the voting form, there is virtually no doubt at all that it would have been the clear winner. Why was it not included? Because my proposals would have allowed voters to choose who governed them and how they would govern. Those elected would have had a clear mandate and opportunity to see policy through all stages to enactment. The situation that existed before the referendum and was reinforced by the vote was that only civil servants were able to push a policy through the States.

Why did people vote for that option? Because of the five choices available, three were clearly ridiculous, one meant no change and only the one favoured by the civil service looked superficially attractive and it wasn’t until it had been implemented that most voters realised their mistake.

It is only by dismantling the structure of government that the civil service has imposed on the island that responsibility for the conduct of States departments can be put back in the hands of elected officials who are answerable to the voting public.

How can the structure of Guernsey’s government be changed in a way that increases democracy and efficiency?

In this case, time is the key to power and changing certain critical timings can help a lot. The first reform I would suggest is to make all senior civil service posts subject to fixed four-year term contracts. At the end of the four years, the civil servant would be able to apply for a further four-year contract but not in the same department. An appointments board would decide which candidates best suited each post, based on standardised assessments of their performances in their last previous post.

All senior civil service contracts would start on the same day, 36 months after the start of the current States. This would mean that politicians taking up new positions would have the benefit of working with senior civil servants who already had three years of experience and senior civil servants taking up new posts would be working with politicians with at least three years of experience.

Because senior civil servants would not be permitted to serve continuously in any department for more than one four-year term, they would find it very difficult to introduce measures that weren’t fully supported by the politicians.

The single major change suggested above would put an end to the ‘boomerang billets’ which propose measures favoured by the civil service that the deputies vote against but then return almost unchanged at regular intervals until the deputies weaken and vote for the unacceptable measures because they cannot face enduring the same debate in a year or two.

Keeping senior administrative civil servants moving from one department to another would reduce their power in comparison to that of political officers.

How should the election of members of the States of Guernsey be changed to improve the administration of public services?

States members have two major functions to perform. One is to lead and take responsibility for departments with hundreds of staff members and annual budgets of millions of pounds. The second function is to represent islanders and ensure that legislation and government actions have the support of the people.

While there may be candidates able to perform both functions equally well, it seems unlikely that a small population could provide enough of these to guarantee an adequate supply for the States but there will be many more who could do one job or the other, but not both.

It would therefore seem sensible to have separate elections for those whom the electorate trust to control large States departments and those who can speak for them in the House.

I have previously suggested that, since the work of States departments affects us all, the electorate of the whole island should elect the presidents/ministers/conseillers who will head each department. Deputies to represent us could then be elected at separate parish-based elections.

Direct elections of ‘ministers’ who had been nominated by other States members to individual posts would much improve accountability and parish-based election of deputies a few weeks later would keep politicians close to their electorate.

Knowing exactly what place in the government the candidates on a list are seeking to fill would make choosing the correct one much more likely and allowing the most senior politicians to seek re-election at the end of a four-year term would give them greater authority over the civil servants.

How should the political structure of States departments be changed to encourage both democracy and efficiency?

In place of the current committee system, I would suggest more direct lines of authority and clearer areas of responsibility, giving steps having increasing levels of responsibility by which new politicians can progress. Policies can and have been derailed because a problem that is glaringly obvious to one group of stakeholders was not foreseen by politicians or civil servants. For that reason I would recommend that each area of States’ activity should have an advisory council, membership of which is open to anyone who can demonstrate a legitimate interest. The councils would all be remote, with no meetings but members being given timely notice of any new initiatives or proposed changes in legislation and asked to pass on any comments, criticism or advice to the deputy, who would collect all comments and reduce them to a manageable summary to assist the conseiller in preparing proposals on action or legislation to take to the States.

Taking Education, Sport & Culture as an example, the structure of the political control would be headed by a single conseiller who had been nominated for the position by States members and elected in island-wide elections. The conseiller would be assisted by three deputies, appointed by P&R from members who had joined the States as a result of success in local elections. One deputy would be responsible to the conseiller for education, one for sport and one for culture and each would be assisted by advice from council members.

The work of each States department would be based on information and advice from departmental civil servants which had been subjected to assessment and comment by members of the advisory council as collected by one of the deputies, then organised and summarised before being passed on to the conseiller. Policy decisions (usually approved by P&R if major) are passed down through the civil service structure but also passed to the deputies, so they are able to monitor implementation of policy decisions.

What else can be done to keep the cost of public services under control?

Step 1 – The civil service should be divided into two sectors, one with those carrying out specialist services directly to the public, who normally have to hold qualifications specific to that role. The other category is those civil servants whose work is purely or primarily administrative. Any public official who is not spending at least 50% of the time in contact with members of the public should be included in the second category.

Step 2 – The remuneration of employees having specific qualifications is subject to market forces and cannot be controlled by artificial restraints but the cost to the island of States administration should be frozen for at least a decade. There must be no increases in the salaries of any administrative civil servants unless they are fully funded out of increased efficiency in the form of reduced staff numbers carrying out the same duties.

Step 3 – Entry to the uniquely generous States of Guernsey pension scheme must be stopped NOW. Any new recruits must join a standard scheme like private sector employees. Subject to negotiation with the representatives of civil servants, the rules of the existing pension scheme must be changed to make it sustainable. If no agreement can be found, the pension fund should be allowed to become insolvent and collapse. Any additional funds required to prevent this must also come from savings made by reducing levels of administrative staff.

Step 4 – The most efficient way to deliver the highest standard of publicly funded services is though independent contractors competing for clients who are free to choose them as service providers. This is already done in relation to the supply of prescription medicines, pre-school care of children and university education and should be rapidly extended to secondary and then primary education and to any other publicly-funded services delivered directly to the public.

Step 5 – In conjunction with the steps set out above, the States should conduct a critical review of its activities and cut as many as possible of those which do not qualify as public services but are public controls. Criminal law should never be used to enforce standards etc. but civil law should be given more power to help litigants obtain fair recompense from those who supply sub-standard goods and services.

Different areas of States activity may require very different methods to remove the ability of public servants to control the lives, work and enjoyment of citizens. The Environment department that inherited the role of the IDC can be scrapped without problem, unless anyone can present reliable evidence that the built environment in the island has been improved by their meddling.

Building control standards could continue to be published (if time allows the building advisory officer to prepare them) but enforcement left to insurance companies and reinforced by allowing the civil court to award punitive damages in cases where a defendant developer/builder etc. had been shown to have deliberately ignored standards.

Other areas could see specific, detailed legislation replaced by ‘catch all’ laws such as those that used to govern medicine sales, often using UK and/or EU laws that local laws ride piggy-back on. Health and safety, data protection, environmental health and many other fields can be removed from States involvement.

Step 6 – Only when all the steps set out above have been fully implemented should the States even consider cutting benefits or services to the public and only when that has been done should the possibility of new or higher taxes even be put on any States agenda.