Opinion: What will come next?

As I wrote before, this isn’t a war of national survival for Israel like Yom Kippur, nor is it just another round of the unending insurgency or intifada. Israel’s response so far, both militarily and politically, has been reflective of what I termed a war of national safety, where it has decided its war aims are to deal with Hamas once and for all.

As before I will not comment on the broader history, perceived or real historical wrongs, or the public protests that focus on simplistic judgements of who is right. Rather, after two weeks of airstrikes and preparation I will focus on what will come next.

Israel, it appears has mitigated the risk on its northern and western borders, with Hezbollah and the Palestinian Authority respectively. Further diplomatic pressure and threats of retaliation have ensured the chance of a wider conflict are less likely, although the narrative of a risk of escalation will continue from some, especially Tehran. So, Israel has been able to concentrate its military on a single front, it has been conducting preparation of the battlefield in Gaza by attempting to clear the civilian population while diplomatically preparing its Allies for what it is about to unleash.

I still believe the more likely scenario is a ground invasion of northern Gaza to a limit of exploitation south of Gaza City. This would mean a military operation covering half the landmass of Gaza including the most built up area. I make this assessment as Israel cannot push further as there is nowhere for the civilians in the Gaza Strip to go. Egypt has not and will not accept an exodus of two million Palestinians into the Sinai and Israel’s stated war aims is the eradication of Hamas not the Gaza Strip.

Israel will have judged that the eradication of Hamas is a legitimate war aim but to deliberately go further would be an unequivocal war crime and lose all international support. But fighting in northern Gaza, in Gaza City, is a hugely dangerous undertaking for Israel. Urban warfare is the most difficult of military environments, it limits the capabilities of many weapon systems, it becomes a war of small units, of snipers and hand to hand combat that can lead to a quagmire of casualties and destruction. Israel will be fighting in a four-dimensional battlespace of the air, the high-rise buildings, on the ground and in the subterranean tunnels that Hamas has dug.

Israel will not wish to be drawn into a costly, high casualty battle, such as the US fought in the Second Battle of Fallujah in 2004. In Fallujah the US had about 13,500 troops against around 1,500 insurgents, about the same ratio Israel has over Hamas. Despite the numerical and technological superiority, the US were almost fought to a standstill. Israel will not risk the same as it doesn’t have the reserves and cannot afford to substantially weaken its defences as that may embolden other regional powers who, so far, have remained less hostile or neutral.

To avoid a battle similar to Fallujah, Israel will not lead with infantry in an attempt to limit civilian casualties or damage to civilian infrastructure as the US did. They will argue they have made reasonable efforts to clear the battlefield and then will fight with little or no restraint. This means maximum use of airpower and artillery to destroy as much resistance as possible and will, theoretically, allow the tanks and infantry to simply roll over what is left. As any surviving point of resistance is found, the infantry will fall back, call in further air and artillery strikes, before moving on.

These tactics aren’t new – they were developed and refined by the British, American and Russian armies in the latter stages of the Second World War. Cities across France, Germany, Poland, Italy and others were reduced to rubble rather than accept the inevitable casualties to the Allied side. If Israel makes the same assessment, then the fate of Caen, Aachen, Konigsberg or Prague in 1944/45 may be the fate of Gaza in 2023.

While the horrors and newness of the Israel-Hamas conflict have stolen the headlines, we must not forget that a larger, more destructive, and more dangerous war continues in Ukraine. The scale of state-on-state war is always more destructive, with the engagement of large armies, modern weaponry across a wider geographic area. While thousands have tragically lost their lives in the Israel-Hamas conflict, hundreds of thousands have lost theirs as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The hopes of a Ukrainian summer breakthrough are well behind us now and the front-line has not materially moved for months. Both sides have dug in, are replenishing their logistics and fighting power, and only low-level fighting patrols and incursions are conducted to maintain morale and offensive spirit. But the nature and destructiveness of this war means that even at a lower intensity more people are likely to have died in the last two weeks in Ukraine than have died in Israel and Gaza so far.

While the global media focus may have switched, the strategic importance has not. President Biden’s address from the Oval Office last week sought to explain the need for vital war aid for Israel and Ukraine; but only $14bn was for Israel and $60bn was for Ukraine. The Ukrainian and Russian soldiers will have to endure another winter of static warfare that will receive little attention but like a smouldering fire it will burst back into flames next year; and probably at an intensity we haven’t seen before.

Next year Ukraine will have F-16 Fighter Jets and more deep penetration capabilities that might, just might, be able to make a strategic breakthrough. But that is just military tactics and what we are still missing is the strategic goal, the definition of winning or compromise that will bring the war to a conclusion.

I recognise that we do live in dangerous and unsettling times with a scale of conflict we haven’t seen since the aftermath of 9/11. I have tried to explain these conflicts, without scaremongering and to provide an insight that is of interest. But I would also like to make a personal observation.

There is a quote often attributed to Churchill that ‘all it takes for evil to triumph is for good men to do nothing’. I had that quote printed on the famous picture of Nazis troops marching past Lloyds Bank in our High Street and I took a copy on every operational tour I served in. From Northern Ireland, to Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, I served because I believed I was a good man, and it was my duty to stand against the evils of the world. My conviction was that I was standing guard so that people could sleep safely at home. I was a soldier so it wasn’t my role to define who was evil, who presented a threat, when and how we should fight; that lies with the politicians.

The quote says it takes ‘good men’, and looking at the current conflicts all the leaders, who are so absolute in their beliefs, are men. From Ukraine with Putin to Zelensky, to the Israel-Hamas with Netanyahu to Haniyeh, or the supporting roles of Sunak, Biden, Egypt’s El-Sisi, or China’s Xi, all the key actors are men. Most have a specific view of the world driven by ideology, religion or historic circumstance and all are convinced of the righteousness of their cause.

I am not attributing the same personal characteristics to all – obviously Zelensky and Putin aren’t the same. But all the most dangerous events we face today were all started, guided and hopefully resolved by leaders who are middle (to old) aged men.

As a gender, we seem incapable of avoiding the folly of war, of indoctrination of others to our world view, of compromising. It may be an unrealistic dream but perhaps if we were led by a few ‘good women’ rather than just ‘good men’ we may live in a better, more considerate world and be less willing to start wars to dominate others.